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God is day and night, winter and
summer, war and peace, surfeit and
hunger; but he takes various shapes,
just as re, when it is mingled with
spices, is named according to the
savor of each.
Heraclitus
 1 Introduction
When Norm perceives a red tomato, there is a way it is like for Norm to undergo
that experience. Norm's experience of the red tomato has a distinctive phenomenal
character. What is the relationship between the phenomenal character of Norm's
experience and the perceived color? One naïve thought is thisthe phenomenal
character of color experience is determined by the qualitative character of the
perceived color. When Norm perceives a red tomato, the qualitative character of
his color experience is determined by the qualitative character of the color manifest
in his experience of the tomato. As Campbell (1997, 189) puts it, the qualitative
character of the color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of the
color.
∗Thanks to Keith Allen, David R. Hilbert, Guy Longworth, MGF Martin, Sydney Shoemaker,
Maja Spener, and Scott Sturgeon for their help and encouragement.
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Shoemaker (2003), however, in a paper critical of Hilbert and Kalderon (2000),
argues that the naïve commitment to chromatic inheritance cannot be sustained. I
will take up Shoemaker's criticisms with an eye to vindicating the inheritance thesis
and thus partially vindicating the naïve conception of color and its relation to color
experience.
 2 Inheritance
How are we to understand Campbell's metaphor of inheritance?
Campbell's metaphor embodies a claim about color and color phenomenology.
It is, however, an instance of a more general claimthat the phenomenal charac
ter of experience is inherited from the objects, qualities, and relations present in
experience.
At a minimum, the inheritance thesis, in its full generality, involves the claim that
a dierence in what's present in experience is sucient for a phenomenal dierence:
Necessarily, if two experiences dier in the objects, qualities, and re
lations they present, then the experiences dier in their phenomenal
properties.
Two qualications are relevant to its proper understandingspecically, about
the nature of the objects, qualities and relations present in experience; and about
the nature of perceptual presentation, respectively.
First, as presently formulated, the claim is noncommittal as to the nature of the
objects, qualities, and relations present in experience. Thus, for example, sense data
theorists maintain that the objects present in perceptual experience are nonmaterial
and that the qualities and relations present in experience are qualities and relations
of these nonmaterial objects. In contrast, representationalists and naïve realists
maintain that, at least in the case of veridical experience, the objects, qualities,
and relations present in experience can be features of the material environment.
Though I provide no argument for this claim, I will assume the following for the
purposes of this paper:
Objects, qualities, and relations of the material environment can be
present in a subject's perceptual experience of that environment.
More specically, and controversially, I will assume that:
Colors are among the mindindependent qualities of the material envi
ronment that can be present in a subject's perceptual experience.
Second, the claim is noncommittal as to the nature of perceptual presentation.
Representationalists maintain that the objects, qualities, and relations present in
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experience just are the objects, qualities, and relations that that experience represents.
In so doing, they endorse a substantive and controversial claim about perceptual
presentationthat perceptual presentation just is perceptual representation. As
opposed to this, sense data theorists and naïve realists maintain that perceptual
presentation is nonrepresentational. For the purposes of this paper, I will be neutral
about the representational character of perceptual presentation.
The inheritance thesis, in its full generality, involves as well the converse claim,
that a dierence in what's present in experience is necessary for a phenomenal
dierence:
Necessarily, if two experiences dier in their phenomenal properties,
then the experiences dier in the objects, qualities, and relations they
present.
This is a substantive claim that may be intelligibly doubtedperhaps theway some
thing is presented in experience, as well as what's presented, can make for a phe
nomenal dierence. Thus, for example, Martin (2002) argues that the phenomenal
dierence between perceiving a color and its sensory imagining is due to the way in
which the color is presented to perception and sensory imagination, respectively.
Finally, to claim that the phenomenal properties of experience are inherited from
what's present in it is to claim more than certain phenomenal properties necessarily
covary with what's present in experience. It involves as well an explanatory claim
an experience has the relevant phenomenal property because of what's present in
experience. This is implicit in the modal implications of Campbell's metaphor of
inheritance. To claim that the qualitative character of color experience is inherited
from the qualitative character of the presented color is to claim that the qualitative
character of the experience depends on and derives from the qualitative character of
the presented color. While the explanatory claim entails that the relevant aspect of
phenomenal character covaries with something present in experience, the converse
entailment fails. Thus, for example, Chalmers (2006) accepts that the phenomenal
properties of experience covaries with what's present in experience (where percep
tual presentation is understood representationally), but maintains that experience
represents what it does because of its phenomenal properties.
Subject to the above qualications, let the chromatic inheritance thesis be the fol
lowing claim:
Color experience inherits its phenomenal character from the qualitative
character of the color present in it just in case:
1. Necessarily, if two color experiences dier in the qualitative char
acter of the color they present, then the experiences dier in color
phenomenology.
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2. Necessarily, if two color experiences dier in color phenomenology,
then the experiences dier in the qualitative character of the color
they present.
3. The qualitative character of the color present in experience de
termines its phenomenal characteran experience has the color
phenomenology it has because of the qualitative character of the
color present in it.
Whether and to what extent chromatic inheritance can be sustained depends,
in part, on the cogency of Shoemaker's criticisms. The case against the necessary
covariation between the qualitative character of the presented color and the phe
nomenal character of the experience that presents it will be considered in section 4.
The necessary covariation might, however, be sustained given a metaphysical hy
pothesis about the colorsthat they have multiple qualitative natures. In sections 5
and 6, we will see that Shoemaker argues that the necessary covariation can only
be sustained in this way at the expense of the explanatory asymmetry. According
to Shoemaker, then, chromatic inheritance ultimately fails because the explanatory
asymmetry involved in talk of `inheritance' cannot be sustained.
 3 Selectionism
Central to the account of Hilbert and Kalderon (2000) is the metaphor of selection.
The metaphor of selection is meant to provide an interpretation of dependency
of color perception on the visual sensibility of a perceiver consistent with the
colors being mindindependent features of the material environment. If the visual
sensibility of a perceiver selects which features of the material environment are
perceptually available, then the perceptual availability of the colors will depend
on the visual sensibility of a perceiver. However, there is nothing contradictory,
or otherwise internally incoherent, about the visual system of the perceiver partly
determining the perceptual availability of mindindependent qualities.
Begin with an abundant conception of properties. On such a conception, there
are indenitely many regularities that obtain in a perceiver's environment. Some
of these regularities are more natural than othersthose grounded in the sparse
properties of the material environment will be more natural than those that are
not. Not all of the regularities present in the material environment are manifest in
the perceiver's experience of the scene. The visual sensibility of a perceiver selects
which of these regularities are perceptually available to the perceiver. Shoemaker
(2003) sympathetically and insightfully characterizes selectionism as follows:
For any ordered set of properties we can dene a similarity relation such
that the degree of similarity of two properties in the set is determined by
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how close they are to each other in that ordering. Perhaps most of these
should count only as relations of quasisimilarity. But what determines
which of these relations count as real or genuine similarity relations?
A rst step towards an answer is to say that such a relation is a genuine
similarity relation if it makes properties similar to the extent that their
instantiation bestows similar causal powers. But what sorts of causal
powers are relevant will vary depending on our interests. In the case
of sensible properties of things, the relevant powers include the powers
to aect the experiences of perceivers; and in the case of the socalled
secondary qualities these are close to being the only powers that are
relevant. Powers to aect experiences will be grounded in powers to
aect the physical states of perceptual systems. And given that a per
ceptual system realizes a repertoire of perceptual experiences standing
in certain similarity relations, there is an obvious sense in which its phys
ical nature determines what properties bestow the powers to produce
in the possessor of the system experiences belonging to that repertoire,
and what relations among these properties bestow similarities with re
spect to these powers. In this sense the nature of the perceptual system
selects what properties are to count as sensible properties, and what
relations among them are to count as similarities with respect to these
properties.
I accept this characterization with the exception of one minor infelicity. It is
not the similarities among perceptual experiences that determines which relations
are perceived as color similarities; rather, it is the ordering on potential states of
the visual system of the perceiverstates that perhaps constitute, at least in part,
perceptual experiencesthat determines which relations are perceived as color
similarities. (The signicance of this qualication will emerge in section 6.)
The selective activity of the visual sensibility is consistent with the selected
similarities supervening on mindindependent colors. Price oers the following
analogy:
If I am to select a bun from the counter my hand must be there to pick
it up. If I move my hand to the left I pick up bun No. 1, if to the right,
bun No. 2. But the bun which I do pick up is in no way dependent upon
my hand for its existence, nor my hand upon the bun. Hand plus bun
do not form an organic whole, and either could exist without the other.
Still less can we say that the hand creates the bun. (Price, 1932, 40)
The selective activity of the visual sensibility does not determine color similarities;
rather it determines the perceptual availability of these similarities and, hence, the
perceptual availability of the colors. Of course, the selected relations and the colors
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they supervene on will reect the nature of the perceiver's visual sensibility. Colors
are thus anthropocentric in something like David Wiggins' (1987), and Hilbert's
(1987), sense of the term, but being anthropocentric makes colors neither less real
nor less mindindependent. The selected family of colors might not be very natural
(though natural enough for their instances to be among the causal antecedents of
color perception), the selected family of colors might only be perceptually available
in certain circumstances of perception or to certain perceivers, but the colors could
be mindindependent qualities of material objects for all that.
Selectionism, as presently understood, has two important consequences.
First, if the visual sensibility of the perceiver selects which of the indenitely
many regularities of the material environment are perceptually available to him,
then perception is partial. Not only is perception partial in the sense that there are
properties of an object not perceptually available (objects may have unobservable
aspects), not only is perception partial in the sense that some sensible qualities of
an object may be occluded from view (the backs of objects are colored as well), but
perception is also partial in the sense there are perceptually available properties of an
object that are not determined by a given perception. If there is more to the sensible
qualities of an object than is manifest in a given perception, then not only might
dierent sensible qualities of an object be perceptually available only in dierent
circumstances of perception, but dierent sensible qualities of an object might be
perceptually available only to dierent perceivers. The partiality of perception has
recently been defended by Hilbert (1987), but it has ancient roots as wellarguably,
Heraclitus is an advocate (see Burnyeat, 1979; Kalderon, forthcoming).
Second, if the visual sensibility of one kind of perceiver selects which of the
indenitely many regularities of the material environment are perceptually available
to him, it is possible that the visual sensibility of a distinct kind of perceiver would
select distinct regularities of the material environment to be perceptually available.
Thus, for example, trichromats and tetrachromats would plausibly select distinct
families of properties to be perceptually available in color perception. Moreover,
it is plausible that an object could instantiate a color perceptually available to
trichromats and a color perceptually available to tetrachromats in which case the
object would be multiply colored. Color pluralism has recently been defended by
Kalderon (forthcoming) and Mizrahi (2006).
 4 The Selection Problem
The visual sensibility's selection of the colors is not exclusive. In this way it diers
from the selection of teams by opposing captains. One captain's selection of a player
as a member of his team excludes the other captain's selection of that player as a
member of the other team. Once a player is selected, that player is not available to
be selected by the opposing captain. But the selection of a property as a member of
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a family of colors perceptually available to one kind of perceiver does not exclude
the selection of that property as a member of a distinct family of colors perceptually
available to a distinct kind of perceiver. The properties selected to be the colors by
distinct perceivers might not themselves be distinct.
There are two ways in which the selected properties can fail to be distinct. Let
the extension of a property be the plurality of objects that instantiate it:
 The selected propertiesmight be coinstantiated in which case their extensions
overlap.
 The selected properties might be identical in which case their extensions
necessarily coincide.
Cases of overlap are not only possible, but are plausibly actualcases of veridical
interspecies perceptual variation are plausibly of this form. Cases of coincidence
are improbable, but seem at least logically possible given selectionism.
Whereas cases of overlap are metaphysically unproblematic, cases of coincidence
are metaphysically problematicor so Shoemaker contends:
But suppose that subjects s1 and s2 have dierently structured color
quality spaces, but that one of s1's colors, call it c1, has as surface color
realizers the same set of reectances as one of s2's colors, call it c2.
More generally, suppose that c1's total set of realizers, those for colored
lights and transparent or translucent solids as well as surface colors,
is identical with c2's total set of realizers. Nothing in the selection
account rules this out, and it seems perfectly conceivable. If the possible
realizers of c1 are the same as those of c2, it is hard to resist the
conclusion that c1 and c2 are the same color. But if they are the same
color, then perceptual systems with dierently structured experiences
spaces can select the same property in the world as one of the colors
while selecting dierent similarity relations between it and other colors.
Assuming that this would not involve systematic misperception on the
part of the possessors of one of the perceptual systems, and there is
no reason to think it would, this contradicts the view of Hilbert and
Kalderon that the colors are individuated by their similarity relations.
And if, as they claim, the phenomenal character of color experiences is
determined by what color similarities they represent, it would seem that
it gives us a case in which veridical experiences of the same color, in the
same viewing conditions, dier in phenomenal character. Given this
possibility, it certainly does not seem that the phenomenal character of
color experiences can be simply inherited from the nature of the colors
they represent. (Shoemaker, 2003)
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We can reconstruct Shoemaker's argument as follows: Internal relations of similar
ity and dierence can be represented by external relations of distance in a space.
Let a color experience space be a representation of the phenomenal similarities and dif
ferences among actual and potential color experiences. Let a color property space be a
representation of similarities and dierences among a family of color properties. Let
Norm and Norma be perceivers with dierently structured color experience spaces.
Given their dierently structured color experience spaces, Norm and Norma's vi
sual sensibilities select families of colors that constitute dierently structured color
property spaces. Thus, for example, Norm's visual sensibility determines a color
experience space, an ordering on actual and potential color experiences. Instances
of certain properties in Norm's environment tend to cause, in certain conditions,
Norm to have one of these color experiences. Given these causal powers, the
properties in Norm's environment are themselves ordered in a way that mirrors the
ordering of potential color experiences. And since Norma has a dierently struc
tured color experience space, the properties of the material environment whose
instances tend to cause, in certain circumstances, Norma to have a certain kind
of experience are ordered in a way that mirrors the ordering of Norma's potential
color experiences and so participate in a distinct color property space to the color
properties perceptually available to Norm. Let c be a property selected to be a
color by Norm and Norma's visual sensibilities. Norm and Norma's experiences
of c are phenomenally dierentwhat it is like for Norm to perceive c in a given
circumstance of perception is dierent for what it is like for Norma to perceive c in
the same circumstances of perception. But then, the chromatic inheritance thesis
would be falsethere would be a dierence in the phenomenal properties of color
experience without a dierence in the color present in experience.
Not only would there be a dierence in the phenomenal properties of color
experience without a dierence in the color present in experience, but the converse
claim apparently fails as wellthere could be a dierence in the color present in
experience without a dierence in the phenomenal properties of color experience.
Suppose that Norm and Norma have identically structured color experience spaces.
For every potential color experience of Norm's, there would be a potential color
experience of Norma's that is phenomenally identical, and for every potential color
experience of Norma's, there would be a potential color experience of Norm's that
is phenomenally identical. But suppose that the color experience spaces of Norm
and Norma are anchored to dierent features of the material environmentTheir
visual systems dier in such a way that they select somewhat dierent properties as
the colors, and somewhat dierent relations as the relations of color similarity and
dierence (Shoemaker, 2003, p. 263). It is possible that there be two properties,
c1 and c2, such that Norm's experience of c1 is phenomenally just like Norma's
experience of c2 in which case a dierence in the color present in experience would
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be insucient for a dierence in the phenomenal properties.
It would seem, then, that the color present in color experience would be neither
necessary nor sucient for the phenomenal properties of that experience. If the
color present in experience is neither necessary nor sucient for the phenomenal
character of that experience, then the phenomenal character of color experience is
not inherited from the color present in that experience.
Should the chromatic inheritance thesis be rejected then? Perhaps not:
Suppose that the dierent perceptual systems select the same prop
erties as maximally determinate colors (as it might be, select the same
set of reectances to be the maximally determinate surface colors), but
dier in the similarity relations they select in such a way that they dier
in the way they group these determinate colors into color determinables
or color categories. The dierence in the phenomenal character of the
experiences that the possessors of these perceptual systems have of one
of these determinates could then be a matter of their representing the
possessors of that property as having dierent determinable properties.
Or, to put it slightly dierently, one of them perceives the determinate
as a determinate of one determinable, and the other perceives it as a
determinate of a dierent determinable, and it is this dierence in rep
resentational content that accounts for the dierence in phenomenal
character of their experience. (Shoemaker, 2003, p. 266)
As Shoemaker observes, it is arguable that this actually happens. Shoemaker
suggests that the intersubjective variation in the spectral location of the unique
hues might be such a case. If asked to adjust a green light such that it is not at all
bluish and not at all yellowish, normal perceivers will consistently do so within 3nm.
In contrast, intersubjective variation in the spectral location of the unique hues is
remarkably wide. The spectral location of the unique hues varies among normal
perceivers by as much as ten percent of the visible spectrum. Thus, something that
appears bluish green to one normal perceiver can appear unique green to another
normal perceiver and yellowish green to a third (see Hurvich et al., 1968). Suppose
that an object looks unique green toNorm and yellowish green toNorma in the same
circumstances of perception. Shoemaker's suggestion is that Norm and Norma are
seeing the same determinate shade of color but are perceiving it to be a determinate
shade of dierent determinables. This is controversial, however, (see Kalderon,
forthcoming, for an alternative).
Certain forms of redgreen color blindness, such as mild forms of deuteranomaly,
constitute a better case, I think. Deuteranomaly is the result of a mutation in the
medium wavelength pigment resulting in a reduction in sensitivity to green portion
of the spectrum. Approximately six percent of the male population are subject to
this mutation (though some estimates are higher). Suppose that a standard Ishihara
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test reveals Norm to be a deuteranomolous perceiver. Suppose, however, that
Norma's color vision is not decient in this way. (The scarequotes are apt since
color blind perceivers can outperform normal color perceivers in certain perceptual
tasks. Thus the military has discovered that color blind perceivers are less prone
to be taken in by camouage.) In certain circumstances of perception, Norm is
prone to take a green thing to be red. It is not the case that Norm cannot see the
dierence between red and green. Broackes, himself a deuteranomolous perceiver,
claims:
. . . I do not have a single kind of perception from red, green, and grey
things in general. I have no diculty in seeing the red of a postbox, or
the green of the grass, and my identication of their colour is not due to
knowing already what kind of thing I am looking at. (I am equally good
on large blobs of paint.) (Broackes, 1997, p. 216)
It is plausible, then, that Norm sees the same determinate shade of green as Norma.
It is just that their visual systems apply dierent color categories to this shade such
that they see it as falling under dierent color determinables with the result that, in
certain circumstances, Norm is prone to confuse it with a certain shade of red. If
Norma apprises Norm of his mistake, or if Norm views the green thing in dierent
conditions of illumination, it is plausible that Norm can come to see the green thing
as green. And given a certain conception of the colors, this is well explained:
This makes perfectly good sense if colours are ways of changing the
light. The person with redgreen deciencies is simply less good at
telling from one viewing what is the object's way of changing the light;
but by getting a variety of views of it, he may none the less recognize
that property. (Broackes, 1997, p. 216)
(For one way of developing this conception, see Kalderon, 2006.)
If there are veridical cases of this kind of perceptual variation, if a determinate
color can fall under dierent determinables thus allowing it to bear dierent simi
larity relations to dierent properties and so participate in distinct color property
spaces, then colors have multiple qualitative natures. A single determinate color
would have a qualitative nature perceptually available to a certain kind of perceiver
and a dierent qualitative nature perceptually available to a dierent kind of per
ceiver.
Parallels with color constancy and metamerism provides some support for this
metaphysical hypothesis.
First, when Norm and Norma have phenomenally dierent experiences of an
identical color c, there is, nevertheless, dierent things present in their respec
tive experiences that can explain this phenomenal dierencec presents dierent
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qualitative aspects to Norm and Norma in the circumstances of perception. This
structurally parallel's the case of color constancythe way in which a color appears
to persist through the changes in its appearance across a range of scenes and con
ditions of illumination. Dierent visible aspects of the color's constant capacity
to modify light are perceptually available in dierent circumstances of perception.
That is an intrasubjective case of dierent qualitative aspects of a color being percep
tually available to a perceiver in dierent circumstances of perception. (See Hilbert,
2006; Kalderon, 2006, for a defense of this understanding of color constancy.) The
present case is an intersubjective case of dierent qualitative aspects of a color being
perceptually available to dierent perceivers in the same circumstance of percep
tion. If perception provides only a partial perspective on the sensory aspects of
the material environment, as a Heraclitean epistemology would have it, not only
is it possible that dierent aspects of a color's qualitative nature are perceptually
available to a perceiver in dierent circumstances of perception, but it is also possi
ble that dierent aspects of a color's qualitative nature are perceptually available to
dierent perceivers in the same circumstance of perception.
Second, when Norm and Norma have phenomenally identical experiences of the
distinct colors, c1 and c2, there is, nevertheless, something commonly present in
their respective experiences that can explain this phenomenal identityc1 and c2
present the same qualitative aspect to Norm andNorma in the circumstance of per
ception. This structurally parallels the case of metamerismthe way in which two
colors can match in color appearance in certain conditions of illumination. That is
an intrasubjective case of dierent colors sharing a qualitative aspect perceptually
available to a given perceiver in the circumstance of perception. The present case
is an intersubjective case of dierent colors sharing a qualitative aspect perceptually
available to dierent perceivers in the same circumstance of perception. If per
ception provides only a partial perspective on the sensory aspects of the material
environment, as a Heraclitean epistemology would have it, not only is it possible
that dierent colors share a qualitative aspect perceptually available to a given per
ceiver in the circumstance of perception, but it is also possible that dierent colors
share a qualitative aspect perceptually available to dierent perceivers in the same
circumstance of perception.
If colors have a multiple qualitative natures, then selectionism is, after all, consis
tent with chromatic inheritance.
 5 Chromatic Inheritance and Causation
Shoemaker (2006) is sympathetic to the idea that properties can have multiple
qualitative natures. However, he doubts whether the chromatic inheritance thesis
can be reconciled with veridical perceptual variation by positing colors withmultiple
qualitative characters:
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If indeed standard representationalism can bemade compatible with the
possibility of spectrum inversion without misperception, that removes
my main objection to it. But I think that is questionable whether allow
ing a color property to have multiple qualitative characters, in the way
required if we are to reconcile the inheritance thesis with the relativity
of color similarity, is really compatible with standard representational
ism. . . . Suppose that a given property occupies dierent positions in
the color property space of creatures a and b, so their experience of it (in
the same viewing conditions) are phenomenally dierent. But suppose
further that the proximate eects of the instantiation of the property
on the visual systems of a and b are the samethe dierence is due to
the fact that the initial input, which is the same in both, is processed
in dierent ways in the two systems. It seems plausible to take a qual
itative character of a color to be individuated by a subset of the causal
features of the property, namely, those involved when the instantiation
of the property cause a color experience in a creature with a certain sort
of perceptual system. . . . But in the case imagined, it will be one and
the same set of causal features of the color property that is the external
source of the phenomenally dierent color experiences its instantiation
causes. And it hardly seems that we can say that the experience inherits
dierent phenomenal characters from the same qualitative character of
the property. (Shoemaker, 2003, p. 269)
We can reconstruct Shoemaker's argument as follows.
Let Norm and Norma be perceivers with dierently structured color experi
ence spaces. Given their dierently structured color experience spaces, Norm and
Norma's visual sensibilities select families of colors that constitute dierently struc
tured color property spaces. Let c be a property selected to be a color by Norm
and Norma's visual sensibilities. Norm and Norma's experiences of c are quali
tatively dierentwhat it is like for Norm to perceive c in a given circumstance
of perception is dierent for what it is like for Norma to perceive c in the same
circumstances of perception. This might be reconciled with the inheritance thesis,
however, if c had multiple qualitative characters. When Norm perceives c, he per
ceives what c is like, but not in all respects. c's qualitative nature is only partially
manifest in Norm's perception of itthere are qualitative aspects to c's nature that
are not perceptually available to him, but are perceptually available to Norma. So
the qualitative dierence between their color experiences is explained in terms of
the dierent qualitative natures of c manifest in their perceptions of it. c will thus
belong to distinct if overlapping color property spaces.
However, there is a problem with this putative reconciliation. Suppose that the
qualitative nature of a color is a subset of its causal powers, namely those involved in
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the production of color experiences. But suppose further that the proximate eects
of c's instantiation onNorm andNorma are the samethe fact that c's instantiation
elicits qualitatively dierent color experiences is entirely due to further processing by
their respective visual systems. Given the sameness of proximate eects, the causal
powers involved in c's instantiation causing Norm and Norma's color experiences
are themselves the same. If the qualitative nature of a color really is a subset of its
causal powers involved in the production of color experiences, then c's qualitative
nature isn't multiple, it is unitary. There could be a phenomenal dierence between
Norma and Norma's color experience without a dierence in what's presented in
their respective experiences thus contradicting chromatic inheritance.
In response to this argument, one might query the background metaphysics of
properties, a metaphysics according to which properties quite generally are causal
powers. Unfortunately, this won't help. Suppose that c's qualitative nature is
something over and above the subset of causal powers involved in the production
of experiences of it. Let q1 be the qualitative nature of c that Norm perceives and
let q2 be the qualitative nature of c that Norma perceives. Given the sameness
of proximate eects, the causal powers involved in c's instantiation causing Norm
and Norma's color experiences are the same. But then it would seem that q2 is
just as causally responsible for the qualitative character of Norm's experience as
q1; and q1 is just as causally responsible for the qualitative character of Norma's
experience as q2. It remains hard to understand how the qualitative character of a
color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of the perceived color.
(See Johnston, 2005, for a similar argument.)
Perhaps this diculty is due to a substantive assumption about the metaphysics
of colorthat colors are monadic properties of objects in which they inhere. So
understood, the color of a tomato depends on how the tomato is in and of itself
and apart from any other thing. Suppose, however, that colors were not monadic
but relationalperhaps they are determined by the relations that obtain between
the object, perceiver, and circumstances of perception. The relationalist need not
deny that the qualitative nature of a color is a subset of its causal powers involved
in the production of color experiences. The relationalist need only deny that the
relevant subset of causal powers are antecedent to the proximate eects on color
perceivers. If color is relational, if colors are determined by relations that obtain
betweenobjects, perceivers, and circumstances of perception, then among the causal
powers would plausibly be those involved in the further visual processing. If distinct
visual processing is required to produce Norm and Norma's qualitatively distinct
color experiences, then Norm and Norma would be perceiving distinct relational
qualities with distinct qualitative natures. The relationalist response works, if it
works at all, by reducing an apparent case of coincidence to the less metaphysically
problematic case of overlap. (Johnston, 2005, argues for color relationalism on
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these grounds; color relationalism has also recently been defended by Cohen, 2005;
McLaughlin, 2003.)
It is an open question whether the relationalist response can be made to work.
Shoemaker (2003) doubts whether it can. However, whether or not the relationalist
response can be made to work is irrelevant, for relationalism is unnecessary to
resolve the problem and so must be motivated on other grounds.
Perhaps the real diculty is not posed by the identication of the qualitative
natures of the colors with subsets of causal powers involved in the production
of color experience, nor by any assumption about the extension of the relevant
subset of causal powers, but by the assumption that the proximate eects of c's
instantiation on Norm and Norma are the same. Allowing for a reasonable amount
of vagueness about what exactly counts as proximate, it is at least arguable that,
over and important range of actual cases of shifted spectra, the proximate eects
of a color on subjects with qualitatively distinct color experiences are themselves
distinct. Specically, in many such cases, the phenomenal dierence is the eect of
dierent patterns of retinal stimulation. Thus the phenomenal dierence between
the experience of a normal color perceiver and a deuteranomolous perceiver is due
to a mutation in the medium wavelength pigment in the latter with the result that,
in the circumstance of perception, the proximate eects on these perceivers will
dierspecically, the peak sensitives of their cones will dier. Not only will a
dierence in the peak sensitivities of the cones result in variation in color vision,
but so will varying the shape of the sensitivity curves. And the intersubjective
variation in the spectral location of the unique hues is similarly due to a dierence
in the retinal eect of the visual stimulus. So, over an important range of actual
cases of shifted spectra, the phenomenal dierence in color experience is due to a
dierence in the proximate eects on the perceivers, on a reasonable understanding
of that notion.
The relevance of this observation might be questioned. Recall that the problem
atic cases for selectionism are cases of coincidencecases where the phenomenally
dierent color experiences present the same color and so their extensions necessar
ily coincide. Whereas cases of overlap are plausibly actual, cases of coincidence are,
at best, hypothetical. But if the problematic cases are merely hypothetical, how
does the fact that in actual cases of shifted spectra the proximate eects dier bear
on whether in hypothetical cases the proximate eects would dier? Couldn't we
simply imagine that, in the relevant hypothetical case, the phenomenal dierence
is due to further visual processing?
One might wonder what exactly are we being asked to imagine. The relevant
case is so far underdescribedwe lack an explanation of the source of perceptual
variation. While we can clearly conceive that the phenomenal dierence is due
to further visual processing, without a further explanation of the source of the
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perceptual variation, we cannot distinctly conceive this. And if we cannot clearly
and distinctly conceive this, we so far lack a reason to believe this to be genuinely
possible. The worry, while genuine, is too weak, however. While we may so far
lack a reason to believe that it is possible that the phenomenal dierence is due to
further visual processing, this is not yet to claim that there could be no such reason.
Further argument is required.
 6 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Powers
The real diculty with the assumption that the proximate eects of c's instantiation
on Norm and Norma are the same lies with a tacit and optional conception of
perceptual experience in terms of which the assumption is understood.
To bring this out, consider how Shoemaker thinks that the necessary covariation
between color phenomenology and the presented color can be preserved but only
at the expense of the explanatory asymmetry crucial to talk of inheritance:
Now in the present example, the color has both the power to produce
one sort of experience in the likes of [Norm] and the power to produce
another sort of experience in the likes of [Norma], and while these
powers are grounded in the same causal features of the color there is a
sense in which they are dierentone is a power to produce one eect,
and the other is the power to produce a dierent eect. So we might
preserve the necessary correspondence by taking these dierent powers
to be the dierent qualitative characters that are presented by the color
to the dierent observers. But given that the causal features that ground
one of these powers are the same as those that ground the other, and that
the powers are dierent because of the dierent phenomenal characters
that experiences have when they are exercised, it would only be a very
Pickwickean sense that the phenomenal characters of the experiences
could be said to be inherited from qualitative characters of the colors.
(Shoemaker, 2006, 476, n. 8)
The qualitative nature of a color is conceived to be an extrinsic causal power. (Shoe
maker cites Robert Boyle's example of a key's power to open a door as an example of
an extrinsic causal powerit is an extrinsic causal power since, without altering the
key, we can deprive it of that power by changing the lock.) The qualitative nature of
a color is a subset of its causal powers, namely those involved in the production of
color experiences. By hypothesis, the color c presents distinct qualitative aspects,
q1 and q2, to Norm and Norma, respectively. If the proximate eects on Norm
and Norma are the same, then the causal features of c that ground q1 and q2 are
the same. Thus if q1 and q2 are genuinely distinct causal powers, they could not
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be intrinsic causal powers. What distinguishes them is the phenomenally distinct
color experiences they elicit in Norm and Norma. But this is inconsistent with the
explanatory asymmetry involved in talk of inheritance. Specically, if a color expe
rience has the phenomenal properties that it does because of the qualitative aspect
of the color it presents, the qualitative aspect must be individuated independently
of the phenomenal experience it elicits. But the distinct qualitative aspects of c
are individuated, in part, by the phenomenally distinct color experiences they elicit.
The phenomenal character of color experience could not depend on and derive from
the qualitative aspect of the color present in that experience.
To reject this explanatory asymmetry is not yet to accept the converse explanatory
asymmetrythat the qualitative character of a color depends on and derives from
the phenomenal character of the color experience it elicits. Indeed, insofar as
Shoemaker is a representationalist, albeit of a nonstandard sort, he must reject
the converse explanatory asymmetry as well. He must maintain, instead, that the
phenomenal character of color experience and the qualitative character of the color
present in color experience are interdependent, or, if this does not come to the same
thing, that they are codetermined.
If what distinguishes q1 and q2 as distinct causal powers is the phenomenally
distinct experiences they elicit, phenomenal experience must be conceived in a
certain wayas a way of being aected. So conceived, a phenomenal experience
is a conscious modication of a subject. This conception of phenomenal character
is usually associated with either adverbialism (see Ducasse, 1942; Jackson, 1977) or
belief in qualia understood as monadic, nonrepresentational qualities of experience
that are immediately present to consciousness (see Block, 1996; Jackson, 1982).
Shoemaker, however, believes neither in adverbialism nor qualia, so understood, but
he evidently shares the more general conception of phenomenal experience as a way
of being aectedat least if phenomenal experience is, indeed, what distinguishes
these extrinsic causal powers.
This general conception, while commonly held, is not, however, universally held
(for criticism see Kalderon, 2006). There is an alternative to conceiving of phe
nomenal experience as a conscious modication of a subject. According to this
alternative conception, the phenomenal character of experience is determined by
the partial perspective it provides on the chromatic features of the material envi
ronment. To know what it is like to undergo a color experience would be to know
the color selectively presented to the perceiver's partial perspective (seeNagel, 1979,
166, 172, 1734). An experience would be necessarily connected to its subject mat
ter since experience, so conceived, just is a perceptual presentation of that subject
matter to a perceiver's perspective. (For more on these alternative conceptions of
phenomenal experience see Martin, 1998.)
These distinct conceptions of the phenomenal experience have distinct implica
16
6 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Powers
tions about the causal structure of color perception.
If the phenomenal character of color experience is understood as a conscious
modication of a subject, then the proximate eect of a color's instantiation and
viewing is individualistically individuatedas it would be if it were conceived to be
the irradiation of a perceiver's sensory surfaces, or more liberally, a pattern of retinal
eects.
If, on the other hand, the phenomenal character of color experience is deter
mined by the presentation of a color to the perceiver's partial perspective, then the
proximate eect of a color's instantiation and viewing would not be individualisti
cally individuated. Instead, the proximate eect would be relationalthe color's
instantiation causes the appropriately situated perceiver to stand in a relation to
that color's instantiation. There is nothing incoherent about a cause having a re
lational eect (where a relational eect is an event constituted by the obtaining of
a relation). And there is nothing incoherent about the relational eect of a cause
consisting in the obtaining of a relation between a thing and that cause. (Consider
the power of the wind to cause a weather vane to point in its direction.)
If the phenomenal character of color experience is determined by the presentation
of a color to the perceiver's partial perspective, then the color's instantiation causes
the appropriately situatedperceiver to stand in a relation to that color's instantiation.
Given the phenomenal dierence between Norm and Norma's color experience,
Norm and Norma stand in dierent relations to the color's instantiationeach has
a unique perspective on the perceived color fromwhich dierent qualitative aspect's
of the color are revealed. (Compare theway in which distinct perspectives can reveal
distinct aspects of an object's threedimensional shape.) But if the proximate eects
of a color's instantiation are relational in this way, and Norm and Norma stand in
dierent relations to the color's instantiation, then the color's proximate eects on
Norm and Norma themselves dierwhich means that distinct causal features of
the color are involved in Norm and Norma's perception of that color. If the distinct
qualitative aspects of the color are distinct subsets of its causal powers that dier
in their proximate eects, then a qualitative aspect of the color must be an intrinsic
causal power.
Of course, the spectral power distribution of the light reaching the perceiver's eye
and its retinal eects, as well as the subsequent, cascading eects of further visual
processing at least partly determine the fact that the appropriately situated perceiver
stands in the relevant relation to the qualitative aspect of the color presented to his
partial perspective. But this does not mean that the proximate eect of a color's
instantiation and viewing is the irradiation of the perceiver's sensory surfaces or,
more liberally, a pattern of retinal eects. To suppose otherwise would be a kind
of level confusion. Compare with the following: Suppose that a subject acquires a
belief in light of new evidence. The change in a subject's epistemic state will, of
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course, be correlated with a change in his neurophysiology and the transition in the
subject's neurophysiological states will at least partly determine the transition in
the subject's epistemic states. But only an implausible reductionism will maintain
that the prior neurophysiological state causes the subsequent epistemic state. On
all plausible alternatives, this latter claim exhibits a level confusion (see McDowell,
1998). Similarly, if the phenomenal character of color experience is determined by
the presentation of a color to the perceiver's partial perspective, then the claim that
the proximate eect of a color's instantiation and viewing is the irradiation of the
perceiver's sensory surfaces or, more liberally, a pattern of retinal eects exhibits
just this kind of level confusion.
Like the relationalist response considered in the previous section, the present
response works, if it works at all, by reducing an apparent case of coincidence to the
less metaphysically problematic case of overlap. However, unlike the relationalist,
the present response maintains that the relation between object, perceiver, and
circumstance of perception does not determine the color of the object so much as
it determines the perceptual availability of a qualitative aspect of that color. The
relation determines the subject's perspective on the object's colora perspective
from which the qualitative nature of the color is only partially revealed.
 7 From Inverted Spectra to Conflicting Appearances
Shoemaker writes of the alleged case of coincidence:
The inverted spectrum scenario I have described is not the one that
has been most frequently discussed in the literature. (Shoemaker, 2003,
270)
While the usual cases of inverted spectra are behaviorally undetectable, the present
inversion which involves visual systems that dier somewhat in the relations they
`select' to be the relations of color similarity, would of course be behaviorally de
tectable (Shoemaker, 2003, 270). I agree that alleged cases of coincidence are not
the usual cases of inverted spectra but only because they are not cases of inverted
spectra at all.
Why believe that the alleged cases of coincidence are cases of inverted spectra?
The temptation is due to two observations and a misleading conception of the
relationship between a color and its qualitative nature. The rst observation is
this: If dierent qualitative aspects of a color are presented to the same perceiver
in dierent circumstances of perception or to dierent perceivers in the same
circumstances of perception, then therewill be a dierence in phenomenal character
without a dierence in presented color. The second observation is this: If the
same qualitative aspect of dierent colors are presented to the same perceiver in
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the circumstances of perception or to dierent perceivers in the circumstances of
perception, then there will be a dierence in presented color without a dierence
in phenomenal character. If the qualitative character of a color is conceived to be
a higherorder propertya property of a property, then it is plausible to describe
such cases as cases of inverted spectra. While a dierence in phenomenal character
is explained in terms of a dierence in what's present in experience, what makes for
the dierence is not the color present in experience, but the presence of a distinct
propertythe qualitative character of the color. On this basis, it is tempting
to suppose that the phenomenal character of color experience is extrinsic to the
presented color. And as we have seen, it is because Shoemaker conceives of the
qualitative nature of perceived colors as extrinsic causal powers that he canmaintain
that there is a necessary correlation between phenomenal character and represented
qualitative nature consistent with the possibility of the inverted spectrum.
However, the qualitative nature of a color is not extrinsic to it in the way required
for the possibility of the inverted spectrum. I have already argued that the qualitative
nature of the color is an intrinsic causal power. Let's, however, approach this matter
from another perspective. Perhaps, properly understood, the qualitative character
of a color may be conceived as a higherorder property, but this conceptions is
incomplete and is thus liable to mislead. The relationship between a color and its
qualitative nature is better conceived on the model of the relationship between a
determinate and a determinable. A particular shade of redred17, sayhas the
qualitative character that it does in part by being a determinate of the determinable
red. Red17 is a way of being redit intrinsically is a determinate of the determinable
red. Determinates intrinsically are determinations of thedeterminables underwhich
they stand. That is the respect in which the higherorder property conception
is incompleteit remains silent on the internal relation between a color and its
qualitative nature. If, as Shoemaker would have it, the qualitative nature of a color
is a subset of its causal powers, they must be intrinsic causal powers.
The inverted spectrum argument, at least in the context of contemporary phi
losophy of mind, purports to establish that the phenomenal character of color
experience is extrinsic to the presented color. In cases of veridical perceptual vari
ation where the same color is presented in each experience, the distinct qualitative
aspects of the presented color are intrinsic to it in a way inconsistent with the
possibility of the inverted spectrum, so understood. If perception is partial, as a
Heraclitean epistemology would have it, the qualitative character of a color is only
ever partially manifest in a given perception. The phenomenal dierence is due
to the distinct partial perspectives on the perceived color occupied by the same
perceiver in dierent circumstances of perception or by dierent perceivers in the
same circumstance of perception. These distinct partial perspectives reveal dif
ferent qualitative aspects of the perceived colorqualitative aspects that the color
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genuinely and intrinsically has. Or consider the case where the distinct colors ap
pear the same in the circumstance of perception. Here, the phenomenal identity
is due to the distinct partial perspectives on the dierent colors occupied by the
same perceiver in the circumstance of perception or by dierent perceivers in the
circumstance of perception. These distinct partial perspectives reveal a qualita
tive aspect shared by distinct perceived colorsa qualitative aspect that the colors
genuinely and intrinsically have. The phenomenal character of color experience is
not extrinsic to the presented color in the way required for the possibility of the
inverted spectrum.
There is a deeper reason why alleged cases of coincidence are not cases of inverted
spectrum.
The inverted spectrumhypothesis has been used for a variety of philosophical pur
poses (see Byrne, Summer 2005, for some of these). In contemporary philosophy of
mind, however, the inverted spectrum hypothesis is used to draw conclusions about
the nature of experiencefor if the color experiences of twoperceivers are spectrally
inverted and if the same color is present in each, then it is plausible that the phenom
enal character of color experience must be determined by something extrinsic to
the presented color. Moreover, it illustrates the perceiverdependency of phenom
enal character. As such, it is one of a battery of considerations that dramatizes the
explanatory gap or hard problem of consciousness. For the perceiverdependency of
phenomenal character can encourage the thought that it is constituted by monadic
qualities of experience whose instantiation depends on a subject's awareness of
them. And it is hard to understand how phenomenal character, so conceived, could
be materially realized.
But the inheritance thesis eectively transforms the inverted spectrum argument
into the problem of conicting appearances. The inverted spectrum argument, at
least in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind, is an argument about the
nature of color experience. In contrast, the problem of conicting appearances,
a much older, indeed, an ancient problem, is a problem about the nature of color.
Suppose that the phenomenal character of color experience is inherited from the
qualitative nature of the perceived color. If phenomenally distinct color experiences,
in a given circumstance of perception, have equal claim to being veridical, then
there's a puzzle about the colors presented by these experiences. If Norm perceives
an object to be one color and, in the same circumstances of perception, Norma
perceives that object, with its color remaining unaltered, to be another color, then
what color is the object? Is it one or the other? Or neither? Or both? Notice how
in reconciling chromatic inheritance with the possibility of veridical perceptual
variation, we were naturally led to speculate about the metaphysics of color. The
eect of the inheritance thesis is to transform a problem about color experience
into a problem about the colors. Under the inuence of the inheritance thesis,
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the problem of understanding how color perception, given its qualitative character,
could be materially realized has become the problem of understanding how the
colors, given their perceived qualitative nature, could be materially realized. The
mindbodyproblem, understood as thehardproblemof consciousness, has dissolved
into the problem of the manifest. (See Byrne, 2006; Kalderon, forthcoming; Sellars,
1963; Shoemaker, 2003, for further relevant discussion.)
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